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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
OREGON SHORT LINE RAILROAD 
COMPANY, a corporation and UNION 
PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, a 
corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs.-
MURRAY CITY, a municipal corpora-
tion, and STATEWIDE PLUMBING 
& HEATING C0l\1P ANY, INC., a cor-
poration, 
Defenxlarnts. 
Case No. 8122 
REPLY BRIEF FOR APPELLANT 
In this Reply Brief Appellant will use the subtitles 
of Respondent's Brief as appropriate. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent on page three makes the statement that 
at the time the railroad was constructed "the land was 
then all public domain, • • • ". 
The fact is that the land was not then public do-
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main. The portion patented to Andrew Cahoon was sold 
to him :May 31, 1869. The land patented to Christian 
Berger was sold to hiln ~fay 7, 1869. The land patented 
to James Randle was sold to him on May 1, 1869. The 
land patented to Peter Hanson was sold to hin1 on Aug-
ust 10, 1869. 
Respondent also on page three states that the prop-
erty claimed by the railroad is fenced on both sides and 
has been since 1920. There is nothing in the evidence as 
to who fenced the property in question and the same 
statement, of course, would be applicable to 2nd West 
Street, i.e., 2nd West is now fenced on both sides. On 
page four counsel states: "There is no evidence as to 
when the school on 61st South Street was first con-
structed." The only school on 61st South is the Liberty 
School which is located East of the site occupied by the 
24th District School which was also known of as the 
Winchester School. The Stipulation of Counsel (R. 102) 
is that 61st South was not cut through when the Win-
chester School was constructed and that the records of 
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints show 
that the Winchester School was constructed in 1874 (R. 
103). 
ARGUMENT 
PRESCRIPTIVE USE 
Such rights as the Appellant has in 2nd West Street 
between 53rd and 64th South Streets, it holds for the 
benefit of all members of the public. These rights as 
well as the rights of the public to the street were acquired 
long before 1\furray City was incorporated. 
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There is no question between the parties hereto 
that there is now a street extending from 53rd South 
to 64th South known of as 2nd West Street and there is 
no question between the parties hereto but what the 
rights of the public in and to the use of that street ante-
date the year 1900. The only question involved in this 
litigation is the na,ture a,nd extent of the public's right iln 
2nd vV est Street. 
As stated in Appellant's brief, Appellant claims the 
public acquired its rights in and to what is now known 
of as 2nd West Street while the same was still public 
domain and that those rights gave to the public full and 
complete ownership of the roadway which was then four 
rods wide. 
Appellant claims that the Deeds obtained by the 
railroad fron1 the abutting property owners were ac-
quired after the road had been established and hence 
were taken subject to the public's existing right to the 
use of the four rods for a road. 
Appellant does not clai1n the public acquired its 
right by prescription. 
EFFECT OF RECITALS IN ANCIENT DEEDS 
There being no question between the parties hereto 
but what the public does have a road, now known of as 
2nd VVest Street between 53rd South and 64th Streets, 
the only question before the court being the extent of the 
right of the public in and to said road, the Deeds frmn 
Handle to Lovendahl and Randle to VVinchester, Hansen 
to Steffenson and Hansen to l\f eyer, as described on page 
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five of Appellant's Brief, were admissible even under 
Respondent's own citation, that such ancient Deeds are 
admissible"* * * when accompanied by possession "" * '"'". 
The last clause of the cited section 9-11 of 20 Am. Jur. 
reads: 
"* * * recitals in ancient deeds are admissible 
to establish the extent of the property conveyed or 
the location of disputed boundary lines." 
Clearly, the public has been in possession of the 
street and its rights are derived, not fro1n Deed, not hy 
prescription, not by condemnation, but under and pur-
suant to the Act of Congress of 1866 ( 43 U.S.C.A. 932). 
Respondent makes some point of the fact that the 
Plat Exhibit D-12 which platted these original Deeds does 
not line up the boundary lines of 2nd West Street ex-
actly as they are today. This court has had sufficient 
experience with the discrepancies which occurred in ori-
ginal surveys that this argument should carry no weight. 
Roach v. Dahl 
84 Utah 377, 35 P 2d 99::3 
Reese v. Murdock 
(Utah 1952) :243 P 2d !J-1-8 
OFFICIAL HIGHWAY MAP AND OFFICIAL MURRAY 
CITY PLAT DO NOT DISPROVE EXISTENCE AND USE OF 
2nd WEST AS A PUBLIC ROADWAY OR STREET PRIOR 
TO 1900. 
Exhibit P -34 being the official highway map of Salt 
Lake County adopted under Section 1122, Revised Stat-
utes of 1898, shows the existence of the road in question. 
It is highway No. 10. Counsel makes some point of the 
fact the map does not show the Oregon Short Line Rail-
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road tracks running down the center of the road. This 
map was not adopted as a railroad map and does not 
purport to have been prepared for the purpose of show-
ing the location of railroads. There is no evidence that 
the railroads were ever surveyed by the map maker or 
that the map was ever intended to accurately show the 
course of the railroad. The evidence is that there never 
has been a North - South road West of State 'Street ex-
cept 2nd West Street running between 53rd and 64th 
South Street. The evidence would indicate that at the 
time the 1nap was made, and prior thereto, that Route 
10 did extend South of 64th South Street. The Deed from 
Hansen to Meyer dated December 16, 187 4, conveys a 
tract of land South of 64th South and one of its courses 
runs to the East line of a four rod street which must have 
been the same extension of 2nd West as shown on the 
map of 1898. The fact that 2nd West South of 64th 
South has apparently been abandoned, offers no succor 
to Respondent. 
SECTION 43 U.S.C.A. 932, GRANTING RIGHTS OF WAY 
"FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF HIGHWAYS OVER PUB-
LI·C LANDS" DOES NOT APPLY TO RAILROADS, AND THE 
PREDECESSORS IN INTEREST OF THE PLAINTIFFS 
HEREIN DID NOT ACQUIRE A VALID RIGHT OF WAY 
THEREUNDER. 
Counsel wishes to point out as set forth in the fore 
part of this Reply Brief that the lands in question were 
not public domain at the time the railroad was built, the 
records of the Bureau of Land 1Ianagement show the 
lands had been sold to the settlers prior to the construc-
tion of the railroad. 
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Appellant agrees with Respondent that 
Hastings & Dakota R. Co. v. Trhitney 
132 U.S. 357, 10 S. Ct. Ll :2, 33 L. Ed. 363 
correctly holds and states the law that a valid homestead 
entry is a sufficient appropriation of land to segregate 
the homestead tract from the public domain and such 
entry precluded any subsequent grant by Congress in any 
manner. The lands in question having been sold before 
the railro·ad was built, the railroad could not take ad-
vantage of the Act of 1866 as a basis of obtaining a right 
to construct a railroad along 2nd West Street. Appel-
lants 1naintain that the fact that the homesteaders, by 
conveyances, executed within a period of four to seven 
years of their purchase of the land, in their Deeds to 
purchasers, made reference to the existence of this road, 
is, in view of the short time between purchase and sale, 
excellent proof that the public had acquired, before their 
purchase from the government, such a right. 
We are talking about a time more than eighty years 
removed and no man now lives with a personal memory 
of what happened in 1869 or 1871 or even 187 4 along 2nd 
vVest Street. But it seems clear, that when these home-
steaders who acquired this property by patent, within a 
year or two, convey away a portion of their land, and in 
tlie conveyances refer to the existence of a "four rod 
county road" that not only did the road exist at that time, 
but that the right, which they so identified, was superior 
to their right under the patent. 
Counsel puts great stress upon the opinion of Judge 
Cooley in the case of Flint & P.llf. Ry. Co. v. Gordon, 2 
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N.vV. 648 (:Mich., 1879). In this case the railroad was 
built across the homesteader's land before the property 
was sold to the homesteader. The Hastings case herein-
before cited and cited by Respondent, shows the inap-
plicability of the Flint case to the facts at bar. Counsel 
also cites the case of: 
Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Richter 
148 P 478, Sup. Ct. of N.1L (1915) 
as following Judge Cooley's decision. The headnote in 
this case reads : 
"An entryman of coal lands of the United 
States who has filed a declaratory statement in 
the United States Land Office, under the provi-
sions of sections 2347-2349, R.S.U.S. (sections 
4659-4661), has a possessory right to the land of 
such a character as to render unlawful an entry 
thereon by a railroad corporation for railroad 
purposes, previous to condemnation proceedings. 
This case cites with approval the following cases: 
Red River, etc. R. Co. v. Sture 
32 :Minn. 95, 20 N.,V. 229. 
Wallowa County v. Wade 
43 Or. 253, 72 P. 793. 
Tholl v. K oles 
65 Kan. 802, 70 P 881. 
~lcAllister v. Okanogan Co. 
51 Wash. 647,100 P 146. 
all in support of the proposition that the grant under the 
Act of 1866 takes effect as of the date of acceptance and 
does not take precedence over the rights of the settler 
on unsurveyed public lands. See also : 
City of Butte v. JI!Iikosowitz 
39 nf ont. 350, 102 P 59B 
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Should the court conclude that the public's right in 
and to the section of 2nd West in question was acquired 
only by prescription, nevertheless such interest gives to 
the City the right to the use of the sub-soils for the in-
stallation of a sewer. See 44 Am. J'ur. 341, 127 A.L.R. 
521, and 
Penrn Railroad. Co. v. Breckenriilge 
60 N.J. Law 583,38 Atl. 740 (1897) 
where the court said: 
"Thus an easement acquired by prescription 
in a railroal right of way has been held not to give 
a railroad company the right to prevent the 
laying of pipes below the surface." 
See American Law of Property, Vol. II, page 486: 
"Where the creation of a public highway op-
erates to vest in the public merely an easement of 
way rather than the fee, a problem arises as to 
the uses by the public that come within the exer-
cise of this easement of passage. It has been said 
that the easement acquired by the public 'include·s 
every reasonable means for the transmission of 
intelligence, the conveyance of persons and the 
transportation of comn1odities.' 
''Where the use of the highway under a fran-
chise from the municipality or state involves the 
sub-surface of the way, there is a conflict between 
this use by the public and the rights of the owner 
of the fee to utilize the sub-soil under the way. 
Generally, the use of the sub-surface of a public 
highway for the construction of sewers, water 
pipes, gas or electric conduits has been held to be 
within the scope of the public easement of passage, 
where the utilities a.re for the benefit of the im-
Inediate surrounding community." 
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This court held that the Public Service Commission 
has jurisdiction over a railroad crossing public streets 
but that the City still has jurisdiction over the sub-soils 
at railroad crossings. See 
Provo City v. Dept. of Business Regu.Za.tion 
117 Utah 607, 218 P 2d 675 
CONCLUSION 
The problem of establishing a right in the public 
created more than eighty-five years ago creates evi-
dentiary problems. Still Appellant maintains that the 
four deeds from the homesteaders, as described on page 
five of Appellant's Brief, are excellent evidence that the 
public right to a road had vested at the time those deeds 
were executed and that the homesteaders considered 
the rights of the public in the road to be superior to 
theirs. The fact that the Trustees of the 24th District 
School constructed a public schooJ on the East side of 
this road in 1874 is rather excellent evidence tha.t at tha.t 
time the public road existed four rods wide with the 
railroad track down the middle. The fact that a portion 
of the road on the East side was still used in the 20th 
Century is important and once having been established 
could only be abandoned by order of the Board of County 
Comrnissioners or other cmnpetent authority (Section 27-
1-3, U.C.A., 1953). There is no evidence of such action 
by the County Cornmissioners or anyone else. 
':.Che fact that the railroad ultimately obtained deeds 
to a portion of the road can have no bearing upon the 
right of the public to the full enjoyment of the road. Sec-
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tion 27-1-7, Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides that: 
"The public acquires only the right of way 
and incidents necessary to enjoying and main-
taining it. A transfer of land bounded by a high-
way passes the title of the person whose estate is 
transferred to the middle of the highway." 
but this certainly does not mean that the public, through 
its duly constituted representatives, cannot utilize that 
road for the installation of sewers, water mains, gas 
mains, electric power lines and telephone lines where they 
all constitute modern methods of transporting and con-
veying things necessary to the public welfare in the 
manner established and accepted in modern society. 
It is respectfully submitted that Respondent is en-
titled to no relief by its cross appeal and the Findings 
and Decree should be corrected in the manner set forth 
in Appellant's Brief. 
Respectfully submitted, 
D. HOWE MOFF'AT 
WENDELL C. DAY 
Attorneys for Appellants 
10 
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